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THE PROGRESS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

R

ARELY if ever in the growth and development of Inter-

national Law has its progress been more marked than in
the last decade. It can no longer be said that the administration of international law is something known and understood
only by Jurists for today the widest interest has been aroused
in the subject of outlawing war, the judicial determination
of international disputes and the pacific settlement of disputes between civilized nations.
Modern international law is said to have had its beginn ing in the seventeenth century. In 1625 Hugo Grotius, a
Dutch jurist and statesman, known as the Father of InternationalLaw, published his volume De Jure Belli ac Paces.
Grotius had been in the foreign service of Sweden and had
actually served as Swedish Ambassador .to the French Court
from 1635 to 1645, during a period of enforced exile from his
native Holland.' A brilliant jurist as well as an able statesman, he did much to stimulate the desire for a code of ethics
to govern the nations of his time in their relations with
each other.
In 1648 the Thirty Years War was brought to a close.
The signing of the Treaty of Peace at Westphalia was the
beginning of a new order of diplomatic relations in Europe.
The war had been tense and bitter and all Europe had been
devastated and ravaged. One can well understand that with
such conditions existing, the idea of establishing rules of
conduct between the nations for the regulation of their diplomatic intercourse was especially essential if the nations of
Europe, as then constituted, were to survive. A code of diplomatic procedure and law then began to develop. Customs
and usages in foreign affairs gradually became established
and came to be known as international law. In Anglo-Saxon
jurisdictions, at least, these early customs and usages are
considered as a part of the common law.
I Reeves, Grotius, De Jure Belle ac Paces, A Bibliographical Account
(April, 1925) 19 Am. J. INT. LAw 251.
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From time to time the great powers have called conferences to settle international disputes, and to determine just
what the international practice was on a given point. This
has been the method of settling international differences for
centuries, and will continue to be the modus operandi until
the day comes when differences on matters international in
scope will be passed upon by a court having compulsory
jurisdiction. The Paris Conference of 1856; the Berlin Conference of 1878, called at the instance of B.ismarck; the Algeciras Conference of 1905; the Washington Conference for the
Limitation of Armaments, called in 1921 by President Harding; the Locarno Conference of 1925; the Armament Conference, called by President Coolidge, and the Kellogg Pact well
illustrate the international practices referred to.
David Dudley Field gave expression to the idea of many
thinking people when he published his Outline of an International Code in 1872. From then on there has been a growing realization, upon the part of jurists and statesmen, that
if an International Court, competent to act, could be established, many troublesome questions arising under treaties
and international law could be amicably settled.
The idea of such a tribunal has long been sponsored by
the leaders of the American Bar and the Government of the
United States. In 1897 President McKinley referred in his
inaugural address to the desire to found such a tribunal, and
then stated that difficulties between nations should be settled
by judicial methods rather than by force of arms.
THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION.

At the first Hague Conference in 1899, the American
delegation was instructed by President McKinley and Secretary Hay to act upon "the long-continued and widespread
interest among the people of the United States in the establishment of an International Court, and to propose a plan
for an International Tribunal to which nations might submit
all questions of disagreement between them, excepting such
as may relate to or involve their political independence or
territorial integrity." 2 Serious difficulties were encountered
2
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(Harv. Univ. Press, 1925).
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at the first Hague Conference when it sought to devise a
method for the select*ion of Judges. Curiously enough the
opposition to formulate any definite plan came from representatives of the German Empire. A convention for the
pacific settlement of disputes was drafted and the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established.3 This Conference
did much to develop and increase the influence of the idea to
adjudicate international disputes. To the Court of Arbitration, established under the Convention in 1900, President
Roosevelt in 1902 submitted the Pius Fund case. This dispute between the United States and Mexico was the first case
submitted to the Court.
This Permanent Court of Arbitration, however, was not
in any true sense a Court. 4 It was merely a list of jurists
numbering about one hundred and thirty, available to hear
parties engaged in an international dispute. The arbitrators
were chosen from this especially prepared list, and those
selected passed upon such matters as were submitted to them
for consideration. It thus lacked the fundamental characteristics of a judicial body and never fulfilled the hopes of the
sponsors of the Conference.
This growing desire on the part of jurists and statesmen
to increase the influence and supplement the work of the
First Hague Conference paved the way for the Second Hague
Conference. The American delegation to this conference was
instructed by President Roosevelt and Secretary Root, to
urge the necessity of creating "a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else,
who are paid adequate salaries and who will devote their
entire time to the trial and decision of international cases by
judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility." The Conference met in 1907 at The Hague and then
agreed to a general plan for the creation of a Permanent
Court of Arbitration. The British, German and American
delegations sought to establish a court with limited jurisdiction, but their efforts failed because an agreement could not
be reached as to the method of selecting judges of the Court
See 2 ScoTT,
'WILsON,

THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE
HAGUE CASE (1915).

24.
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that was to be created and so little, if anything, was accomplished at that Conference.
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.

At the conclusion of the World War a treaty of peace
between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers was
negotiated at Paris, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.
This treaty was formally ratified January 10, 1920. Article
14 of Part 1 of the Versailles Treaty provided as follows:
"The Council shall formulate and submit to the
members of the League for adoption plans for the
establishment of a Permanent Court of International
Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and
determine any dispute of an international character
which parties thereto submit to it. The Court may
also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or
question referred to it by the Council or by the
Assembly."
The Council of the League of Nations lost no time in
carrying out this mandate. At its second session in February, 1920, the Council invited a group of distinguished jurists
to frame a plan for a world court.5 The committee met and
in due course made a report to the Assembly which was
finally adopted on December 13, 1920. A protocol for signature was opened on December 16, 1920, and the project for
the Court was approved by the Council and Assembly of the
League of Nations shortly .thereafter.
The Court is composed of fifteen judges and four deputy
judges, who are elected for a term of nine years.6 A judge
can be removed only by the unanimous consent of the other
members of the Court.' A new court is elected every nine
years and all members are eligible for re-election." The duties
of the judges are either judicial or administrative. 9
'Russell D. Greene, America and the World Court (May 1926) THE BRIEF
OF PHI DELTA PHI.

"Art.
7Art.
"Art.
"Art.

13.
18.
13.
16.
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While the Statute provides for the annual session of the
Court to open on June 15th and to continue until the business of the Court is completed, extraordinary sessions may
be called by the President of the Court from time to time. 10
A preliminary session was held in 1922 to draw up the rules
of the Court."
The2 Court remains in session until its
agenda is exhausted.'
A Committee of Jurists met on March 11, 1929 to consider the revision of the Statute 13 and many important
changes were recommended. These changes were embodied
in a Protocol of Revision of the Statute which was opened
for signature on September 14, 1929, 1 but this Protocol of
Revision has not yet gone into effect. This amended Statute
increased the number of judges to fifteen, while the office of
deputy judge was abolished. The Court will remain in ses15
sion for practically the entire year.
The Court, contemplated under Article XIV of the
Covenant, was to be "competent to hear and determine any
dispute of an international character which the parties
thereto submit to it." In working out the Protocol that
included the Statute of the Court this broad principle was
carefully adhered to.
The Statute provides for two classes of jurisdiction.
The Court is "open to the Members of the League and to
states mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant." In Article
XXXIV of the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is
stated, "Only States or Members of the League of Nations
can be parties in cases before the Court."
The second paragraph of Article XXXV of the Covenant
of the League of Nations grants to the Council, "subject to
the special provisions contained in the treaties in force," the
authority to lay down the conditions under which the Court
shall be open to other states than those mentioned. This was
covered by a resolution of May 17, 1922, which provided that
the Court is to be open if "such State shall previously have
10Art. 23.

" 0.

HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 2 at 11.
'Art. 23.
2 L. OF N. PUB. (1929).
" Official text printed in L. oF N. PUB. (1929)
"Art. 23.

pp. 1843 et seq.
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deposited with the Registrar of the Court a declaration by
which it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court, in accordance
with the Covenant of the League of Nations and with the
terms and subject to the conditions of the Statute and Rules
of the Court, and undertakes to carry out in full good faith
the decision or decisions of the Court and not to resort to
war against a state complying therewith."
Article XXXVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides that "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises
all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially
provided for in treaties and conventions in force."
The following States have accepted the Court Statute: 16
States
Albania
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czecho-Slovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Guatemala

Date of Signature

Before

Before
Before
Before
Before
Before

Before
Before
Before

June
June
June
May
June
Feb.
April
March
Sept.
Feb.
Feb.
Jan.
Feb.
May
Jan.
Sept.
Oct.
July
June
Feb.
Dec.
Feb.
Feb.
Dec.

18, 1921
16, 1921
18, 1921
9, 1921
20, 1921
25, 1921
10, 1921
30, 1921
7, 1921
25, 1921
25, 1921
28, 1921
25, 1921
19, 1921
28, 1921
30, 1924
18, 1921
12, 1926
28, 1921
25, 1921
10, 1926
25, 1921
25, 1921
17, 1926

Ratiflcation
July
13, 1921
Aug.
July
Aug.

4, 1921
23, 1921
29, 1921

Nov.
Aug.
Aug.
July
May

1921
1921
1921
1928
1922

Jan.
Sept.
June

12, 1922
2, 1921
13, 1921

May

July
April
Aug.
March
Aug.

Oct.

1923
1926
1922
1921
1927
1921
1921

'" This data was furnished through the courtesy of Charles B. Hagan, M.A.,
University of Virginia, graduate student in International Law at Harvard
University, 1932.
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States
Haiti
Hungary
India
Irish Free State

Italy
Japan
Latvia
Liberia
Lithuania
Luxemburg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Panama
Paraguay
Persia
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Rumania
Salvador
Siam
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United States of
America
Uruguay
Venezuela
Jugo-Slavia

Ratification
Date of Signature
5, 1921
Before Sept.
Sept.
7, 1921
1, 1923
Aug.
Nov. 20, 1925
25, 1921
Before Feb.
Aug.
4, 1921
From Aug.
21, 1926
I
25, 1921
June 20, 1921
Before Feb.
Before Feb.
25, 1921
Nov.
16, 1921
Feb.
12, 1924
Sept. 11, 1923
Before Sept.
1, 1921
1922
Oct.
5, 1921
May
Before Feb.
25, 1921
1930
Sept.
25, 1921
Aug.
1921
Before Feb.
1921
25, 1921
Aug.
Before Feb.
Sept. 14, 1929
Aug.
20, 1921
Before Feb.
25, 1921
25, 1921
Before Feb.
June
14, 1929
Before Feb.
25, 1921
April
46,1921
April 25, 1931
Sept. 14, 1929
Before Feb.
25, 1921
1921
Aug.
28, 1921
1921
Before Jan.
Oct.
1921
Aug.
April 15, 1921
28, 1921
1930
Before Jan.
Aug.
Feb.
1922
Before Feb.
25, 1921
Aug.
1921
25, 1921
Before Feb.
1921
April
6, 1921
Aug.
21, 1921
Feb.
1921
Before Feb.
July
28, 1921
1921
Before Jan.

Dec.
Before Jan.
Before Feb.
May

1929
1921
1921
1921

Sept.
Dec.
Aug.

27, 1921
2, 1921
12, 1921

The following States have accepted the Optional Clause:
States
Albania
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada

Effective Until
Sept. 17, 1935
Aug.
18, 1940
March 13, 1937
March 10, 1941
Feb.
5, 1935
Indefinite
July
28, 1940
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States
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Haiti
Hungary
India
Irish Free State
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxemburg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Panama
Portugal
Rumania
Salvador
Siam
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Uruguay
Jugo-Slavia

Effective Until
June
13, 1936
2, 1938
May
April
6, 1937
April 25, 1936
28, 1933
Feb.
Feb.
5, 1940
Sept.
12, 1934
Indefinite
Aug.
13, 1934
Feb.
5, 1940
July
11, 1950
Sept.
7, 1936
26, 1935
Feb.
14, 1935
Jan.
Sept. 15, 1935
Aug.
6, 1936
March 29, 1940
Oct.
3, 1936
Indefinite
Indefinite
9, 1936
June
Indefinite
7, 1940
May
7, 1940
April
Sept. 21, 1938
Aug.
16, 1936
July
25, 1936
Indefinite
Nov.
24, 1935

The following States signed the Optional Clause but
have not ratified it:
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czecho-Slovakia
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Liberia
Nicaragua
Persia
Peru
Poland
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Renewals:
Austria
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Lithuania
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland

Article XXX of the Covenant of the League of Nations
further declares that, "The Members of the League of Nations and the states mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant
may, either when signing or ratifying the Protocol to which
the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later date, declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other Member or state
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court
in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:
(a) The interpretation of a Treaty;
(b) Any question of International Law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of any international
obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation."
All questions of jurisdiction are settled by the decision
of the Court itself.
The Court in its deliberations applies international law
derived from the following sources:
(1) International conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(2) International custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law;
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(3) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(4) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, .judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
The first judgment of the Court was rendered in 1923,
and since then final decisions have been given in cases involving Minorities, Mandates and the interpretation of peace
treaties.
JUDGMENTS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL,
JUSTICE.

1. (August 17, 1923) First Judgment-Case of the S.S.
Wimbledon, involved the freedom of the Kiel Canal.
2. (August 30, 1924) Second Judgment-The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions.
3. (September 12, 1924) Third Judgment-Interpretation of the Treaty of Neuilly, Article 179, Annex, Paragraph 4.
4. (March 26, 1925) Fourth Judgment-Interpretation
of the Court's Third Judgment.
5. (March 26, 1925) Fifth Judgment-The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions.
6. (August 25, 1925) Sixth Judgment-German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia.
7. (May 25, 1926) Seventh Judgment-German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia. (The merits.)
8.
diction
Polish
nitrate

(July 26, 1927) Preliminary objections to the jurisof the Court to determine the existence and extent of
obligations for injuries incident to seizure of the
factories.
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9. The right of Turkey to punish foreigners for acts
done in a collision on the high seas.
10. (October 10, 1927) Preliminary objections to jurisdiction in regard to concessions in Palestine.
11. (December 16, 1927) Interpretation of Judgment
No. 7.
12. (April 26, 1928) Interpretation of the GermanPolish Convention of 1922 relating to minority schools.
13. The Chorzow factory case.
14. (July 12, 1929) Decision as to whether certain Serbian loans issued in France should be paid in gold or paper
francs.
15. (July 12, 1929) Decision as to whether certain Brazilian loans issued in France should be paid in gold or paper
francs.
16. (September 10, 1929) Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder.
ORDERS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE.

The case of Belgium v. China, where Belgium instituted
a suit under Article 36 against China for denouncing a unilateral treaty. Four provisional orders were issued to preserve the rights of Belgians. The case was withdrawn by
Belgium February 13, 1929.
In the case of France v. Switzerland in 1924, two orders
were issued by the Court leaving the question open for
further consideration.
CASES NOW PENDING BEFORE THE COURT.

1. Free Zone of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex.
2. Legal status of certain parts of Eastern Greenland.
3. Delimitation of territorial waters between the island
of Castellorizo and the coast of Anatolia.
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ADVISORY OPINIONS.

Article XIV of Covenant of the League of Nations provides that the Court may give, at the request of the Council
or the Assembly, "an advisory opinion upon any dispute or
question referred to it."
The procedure of the Court in the matter of advisory
opinions is similar to that of ordinary judicial proceedings in
our legal system. The notification of a request for an opinion
from the Court is forwarded to the Registrar, who thereupon
gives notice to Members of the League and to States entitled
to appear before the Court. Information in such instances is
sought from all interested States or organizations. States
not receiving notification but desiring to be heard are permitted to appear. The rules of Court provide that "Advisory
opinions shall be read in open Court after notice has been
given to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and
to the representatives of States, of Members of the League
and of international organizations immediately concerned." 17
Adequate publicity is thereby assured the proceedings
of the Court.
The Protocol of Revision of the Statute of the Court
amends the Statute so as to provide greater publicity.
ADvISORY OPINIONS.

1. (July 31, 1922) First Advisory Opinion-Nomination of Delegates to the International Labor Conference.
2. (August 2, 1922) Second Advisory Opinion-Competence of the International Labor Organization as to conditions of labor of agricultural workers.
3. (August 12, 1922) Third Advisory Opinion-Competence.
4. (February 7, 1923) Fourth Advisory Opinion-Nature of the British-French dispute about nationality decrees
in Tunis and Morocco.
"Rules, Arts. 72, 73, 74.
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5. (July 23, 1923) Fifth Advisory Opinion-Dispute
between Finland and Russia as to Eastern Carelia.
6. (September 10, 1923) Sixth Advisory OpinionValidity of the contracts and leases of German settlers in
Poland.
7. (September 15, 1923) Seventh Advisory OpinionAcquisition of Polish nationality by German settlers.
8. (December 6, 1923) Eighth Advisory Opinion-The
Jaworzina boundary question between Poland and CzechoSlovakia.
9. (September 4, 1924) INinth Advisory Opinion-The
Monastery of Saint Naoum and the Albanian Frontier.
10. (February 21, 1925) Tenth Advisory OpinionMeaning of the term "established" in the Lausanne Convention for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations.
11. (May 16, 1925) Eleventh Advisory Opinion-Dispute in regard to the Polish postal service in the Free City
of Danzig.
12. (September 19, 1925) Twelfth Advisory Opinion
concerning the interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne.
13. (March 17, 1926) Thirteenth Advisory Opinion concerning the competence of the International Labor Organization to Regulate the Personal Work of the Employer.
14. (December 8, 1927) An opinion as to the jurisdiction of the Danube River Commission.
15. (March 3, 1928) An opinion as to the competency
of the Danzig Courts in cases involving the Polish Railways
Administration.
16. (August 28, 1928) An opinion interpreting the
Greco-Turkish Agreement for exchange of populations.
17. (July 31, 1930)
Bulgarian Convention.

An opinion defining the Greco-

18. (August 26, 1930) An opinion as to whether Danzig
was competent to become a member of the International
Labor Organization.
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19. (May 15, 1931) An opinion as to the minority
schools in Upper Silesia.
20. (September 5, 1931) An opinion as to the compatibility of the proposed Austro-German Customs Union with
the Geneva Convention and the Treaty of Trianon.
21. (October 15, 1931) Railway traffic between Lithuania and Poland. Interpretation of conventions.
22. (December 11, 1931) Access to, or anchorage in,
the Port of Danzig of Polish war vessels.
23. (February 4, 1932) Treatment of Polish nationals
and other persons of Polish origin or speech in the Danzig
territory.
PENDING REQUESTS FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION.

Interpretation of the Caphandaris-Molloff Agreement
of December 9, 1927. (Bulgaria and Greece).
The Court refused to give an Opinion where the Council
had requested an interpretation of a treaty between Finland
and Russia. The former was a Member of the League and
the latter was not. Russia refused to appear before the Court
or to aid in the proceedings. In refusing to consider the
question submitted without the appearance or consent of
Russia, the Court said:
"It is well established in international law that
no State can, without its consent, be compelled to
submit its disputes with other States, either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific
settlement. Such consent can be given once and for
all in the form of an obligation freely undertaken, but
it can, on the contrary, also be given in a special case
apart from any existing obligation. * * * The Court,
being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding
their activity as a Court."
An interesting comment as to the Court's conception of
international law is gained from the fourth opinion. A dis-
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pute arose between England and France over certain nationality decrees concerning Tunis and Morocco. Because of
treaties the matter was one solely within the domestic jurisdiction of France. The Court in its opinion said:
"The question whether a certain matter is or is
not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an
essentially relative question; it depends upon the de
velopment of international relations. Thus, in the
present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the Court, in principle
within this reserved domain."
UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT.

On February 17, 1923, the Secretary of State submitted
a letter to President Harding, outlining the immediate questions involved in American adherence to the Permanent
8
Court of International Justice.'
In that letter four points are raised as necessary to be
settled prior to signature:
(1)

That such adhesion shall not be taken to involve
any legal relation on the part of the United
States to the League of Nations or the assumption of any obligations by the United States
under the Covenant of the League of Nations constituting Part 1 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(2)

That the United States shall be permitted to participate through representatives designated for
the purpose and upon an equality with the other
States, members respectively of the Council and
Assembly of the League of Nations, in any and
all proceedings of either the Council or the Assembly for the election of judges or deputy judges
of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
or for the filling of vacancies.

1864 CONG. REC. pt. 5, pp. 4498 et seq.
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(3) That the 'United States will pay a fair share of
the expenses of the Court as determined and appropriated from time to time by the Congress of
the United States.
(4) That the Statute for the Permanent Court of
International Justice adjoined to the Protocol
shall not be amended without the consent of the
United States.
A week later, on February 14th, this letter was transmitted by the late President Harding to the Senate. Both
the President and the Secretary of State, Charles Evans
Hughes, urged favorable action. Two years later, March 3,
1925, the House of Representatives passed a resolution expressing "its cordial approval of the Court and an earnest
desire that the United States give early adherence to the
Protocol establishing the same, with the reservations recommended by President Harding and President Coolidge."
The following year, January 27, 1926, the Senate gave
its advice and consent to the adherence with the following
reservations: 19
(1) That such adherence shall not be taken to involve
any legal relation on the part of the United
States to the League of Nations or the assumption of any obligations by the United States under the treaty of Versailles.
(2) That the United States shall be permitted to participate through representatives designated for
the purpose and upon an equality with the other
states, members, respectively, of the Council and
Assembly of the League of Nations, in any and
all proceedings of either the Council or the Assembly for the election of judges or deputy judges
of the Permanent Court of International Justice
or for the filling of vacancies.
(3) That the United States will pay a fair share of
the expenses of the Court as determined and appropriated from time to time by the Congress of
the United States.
67 CONG. Rsc. pt. 3, pp. 2824-2825.
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(4) That the United States may at any time withdraw its adherence to the said Protocol and that
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice adjoined to the Protocol shall not
be amended without the consent of the United
States.
(5) That the Court shall not render any advisory
opinion except publicly after due notice to all
states adhering to the Court and to all interested
states and after public hearing or opportunity
for hearing given to any states concerned; nor
shall it, without the consent of the United States,
entertain any request for an advisory opinion
touching any dispute or question in which the
United States has or claims an interest.
It was also provided that the signature should not be
affixed "until the Powers signatory to the Protocol shall have
indicated through an exchange of notes their acceptance of
the foregoing reservations and understandings as a part and
a condition of adherence by the United States to the said
Protocol." The further reservation was added as follows:
"This action shall not be so construed as to require the United States to depart from its traditional
policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or
entangling itself in the political questions of policy
or internal administration of any foreign state; nor
shall adherence to the said Protocol and Statute be
construed to imply a relinquishment by the United
States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."
Secretary of State Kellogg transmitted these reservations to the Secretary-General of the League. At the instance
of Sir Austen Chamberlain of Great Britain, the Council
called a Conference of the Signatores in September, 1926.0
The United States refused to take part in this meeting, Sec'

L.

OF

N. 0.

J. (1926) pp. 535-536.
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retary of State Kellogg having contended
that acceptance be
21
accomplished by an exchange of notes.
A draft protocol was drawn up which, it was thought,
would meet the requirements of the United States. It was
transmitted to Secretary of State Kellogg in September,
1926.22 Further action was delayed until the latter part of
1928. On February 6, 1928, the Senate cons'idered a resolution urging further exchange of views on the part of the
President.
The Assembly, shortly thereafter, directed its attention
to the need of revising the Statute and suggested that the
Council take appropriate action. A committee of Jurists was
appointed and in March, 1929, this committee submitted
draft protocols. After consideration of these by the Council
and the Assembly these Protocols were opened for signature
September 14, 1929. There are three Protocols relating to
the Court. The Protocol of Signature of December 16, 1920,
the Protocol of Revision of September 14, 1929, and the
Protocol for the Adhesion of the United States bf the same
date.
The Protocol for the Adhesion of the United States to
the Protocol of Signature of December 16, 1920, was an
attempt to meet the Reservations of the United States Senate. The main difficulty presented was the question of Advisory Opinions and withdrawal of the United States from the
Court. The Fifth Senate Reservation relates to the Court's
procedure in Advisory opinions and deals with questions of
jurisdiction.
The question of unanimous consent that may be required
in a request for an advisory opinion has resulted in a divergence of views. The declaration in this Senate Reservation
would, if accepted, bind the Court. It has been thought that
the provision, "claims an interest," in the Senate Reservation, might hinder the rendering of advisory opinions which
the League has come to consider an important function of
this Court.
The specific problem of the Jurists was to reconcile these
points of view. The Root formula suggested was as follows:
'L. oF N. PUB. (1926) Vol. 26, annex 6, p. 71.
2 Supra note 20 at 1565.
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"The more hopeful system is to deal with the
problem in a concrete form, to provide some method
by which such questions as they arise may be examined and views exchanged, and a conclusion thereby
reached after each side has made itself acquainted
with the difficulties and responsibilities which beset
the other."
Article 5 of the Protocol provides:
"With a view to ensuring that the Court shall
not, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any
dispute or question in which the United States has or
claims an interest, the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations shall, through any channel designated for that purpose by the United States, inform
the United States of any proposal before the Council
or the Assembly of the League for obtaining an advisory opinion from the Court, and thereupon, if desired,
an exchange of views as to whether an interest of the
United States is affected shall proceed with all convenient speed between the Council or Assembly of the
League and the United States.
"Whenever a request for an advisory opinion
comes to the Court, the Registrar shall notify the
United States thereof, among other states mentioned
in the now existing Article 73 of the Rules of the
Court, stating a reasonable time limit fixed by the
President within which a written statement by the
United States concerning the request will be received.
If for any reason no sufficient opportunity for an
exchange of views upon such a request should have
been afforded and the United States advises the Court
that the question upon which the opinion of the Court
is asked is one that affects the interests of the United
States, proceedings shall be stayed for a period sufficient to enable such an exchange of views between the
Council or the Assembly and the United States to
take place.
"With regard to requesting an advisory opinion
of the Court in any case covered by the preceding
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paragraph, there shall be attributed to an objection
of the United States the same force and effect as
attaches to a vote against asking for the opinion given
by a Member of the League of Nations in the Council
or in the Assembly.
"If, after the exchange of views provided for in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, it shall appear that
no agreement can be reached and the United States
is not prepared to forego its objection, the exercise of
the papers of withdrawal provided for in Article 8
hereof will follow naturally without any imputation
of unfriendliness or unwillingness to co-operate generally for peace and goodwill.
The Senate Reservation provides that the United States
may withdraw its adherence at any time to the Protocol of
December 16, 1920, and notification to the Secretary-General
is sufficient to effect such separation. The Protocol of Adhesion provides it "shall be considered as ceasing to be in
force ifand when, within one year from the date of receipt
of the said notification, not less than two-thirds of the contracting states other than the United States shall have notified the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that they
desire to withdraw the above-mentioned acceptance." It is
further provided that the United States may withdraw "without any imputation of unfriendliness or unwillingness to
co-operate generally for the peace of the world."
By order of President Hoover, Secretary of State Stimson authorized the United States Charge d'Affaires at Berne
to affix the signature of the United States to the three Protocols. On December 10, 1930, these were transmitted to the
Senate for their advice and consent, which body is now considering these protocols.
The world cries out for peace. The sacrifice of the lives
of millions upon the field of battle in the late war must not
have been in vain. Let us hopefully look forward to the day
not far distant when the orderly process of law will be substituted for the devastating processes of war.
RUSSELL D. GREENE.
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